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The Descent Unseen: Greece's Unappreciated Place in British Political History 
Kenneth Schneider 
From 1815-1915, the empire of Great Britain enjoyed a one hundred year period of uninterrupted economic and 
political prosperity known as the Pax Britannica. However, just a few decades after this time of hegemony, the same 
nation underwent a drastic change that would alter the reality of its international influence. This realization did not 
occur due to a loss of a colony from peaceful pressure, like India, or violent revolutions, like in Egypt. Instead, the 
response to events within Greece between December 1944 and June 1945 signaled the beginning of a British 
acceptance of their position in world politics as a secondary player, and one that shied away from the imperial 
mindset of old to recognize its place given the rising status of the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
identification of this trend had noticeable implications on British political history.  The aforementioned rising stature 
of the United States and the Soviet Union forced Great Britain to alter its policy course in Greece, and therefore 
symbolized the decline of British political power.[1] 
British interest in Greek affairs did not begin during Prime Minister Winston Churchill's term, but rather originated 
more than a hundred years prior. With the beginning of the Greek War of Independence in March of 1821, the 
powers of Europe recognized the degenerative state of the Ottoman Empire, and the need to position themselves 
appropriately for the benefits of supporting a successful revolution. In recognition of the fact that a settlement could 
never be reached, British Foreign Secretary George Canning told the Turks that he would honor the friendly relations 
between them in exchange for assurances that Christians who resided within the empire would not be harassed. By 
1824, leaders of the Greek Revolution took out loans from British fund-holders, which, in effect, made London a 
sponsor of the revolution and inspired the creation of the 'British' political party in Greece. After this point, Great 
Britain, along with nations like France and Russia, provided military assistance to the First Hellenic Republic at battles 
such as the naval Battle of Navarino (1827), where an Allied fleet of British, Russian and French warships defeated 
an Ottoman armada. British interjection persisted after the revolution, such as during the debate over monarchial 
succession after the deposition of King Otto in 1862.[2] 
During World War II, several nationalist factions throughout Greece arose in resistance to the German Army, similar 
to groups in South-East Asia in response to the Japanese Army. As with many similar movements, some of these 
allied themselves with the communist mindset, while others chose a more republican ideal. The Ethnikos 
Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos, or EDES (National Republican Greek League), originated as grassroots resistance 
to the Germans and the communists. In June of 1944, a liaison officer of the British Army referred to within telegrams 
as Major Bathgate, submitted a report to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs classifying the different Greek 
nationalist groups. He described the EDES as a movement mainly kept going by a few officers, such as Napoleon 
Zervas and his ally Major Agoras, and most of his officers were pro-monarchy. According to this report, Zervas was 
a capable leader, but his organization's shortcomings in combat could be narrowed down to five reasons: poor 
discipline, bad communication, no system of patrolling, no knowledge of infiltration or lines of battle, and long, 
useless typewritten orders on topics such as regimental construction. [3]  
On the other hand, the communists within Greece generally fell under the Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas or the 
KKE (The Communist Party of Greece). By September of 1941, during a meeting of the KKE, the Ethniko 
Apeleftherotiko Metopo or EAM (National Liberation Front) was formed and become one of the most organized 
resistance groups in World War II. The EAM's militant wing, Ellinikós Laïkós Apeleftherotikós Stratós, or the ELAS 
(Greek People's Liberation Army) would become infamous to republicans and royalists alike; British War Cabinet 
communications described it as a "well organized gang of terrorists".[4] For example, Major Bathgate told of how 
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middle-aged men and women were forced to carry kalamboki, or maize, for days across mountains and deep snow 
to feed the soldiers of the ELAS. Additionally, a boot manufacturer in the town of Volos was threatened by the ELAS 
to increase his leather supplies in order to supply additional forces, or else risk physical violence. Ares, the leader of 
the ELAS, had a reputation of being responsible for many murders and an overall pattern of ruthlessness. Despite 
these clear signs of ELAS aggression, Churchill would later say to the House of Commons that he clearly 
underestimated the power of the group. Churchill looked only at the ELAS's efficiency and goals fighting the 
Germans, but not their actions towards fellow countrymen. He would later realize their more sinister goal of 
transforming Greece into a Communist State with a totalitarian liquidation of all political opponents.[5] 
The communist sentiment of groups such as the ELAS also began to take hold in Greeks outside of the country. The 
individuals most vulnerable to this dissention were the military stationed to protect the controversial King George 
II, ruling in exile in Egypt. The success of the ideological infiltration resulted in dissention amongst several army and 
naval units. The Egyptian Mutiny, in April 1944, was a quintessential early demonstration of the deep-seated 
animosity between the Communist and Republican elements of Greek military and political institutions. This conflict 
arose from the desire of the communist elements within the Greek government and citizenry to force King George 
II to call for a plebiscite, in order to organize a new government for the nation while he was still in exile. The king 
was not supportive of their efforts, he believed that he was pressed to include them in his government. However, 
what was seen as seditious efforts were also attempts by his Prime Minister, Emmanouil Tsouderos, to get a widely 
popular archbishop appointed as regent through the Constitutional Act. According to Tsouderos, not only was the 
king's delay in signing the act, 'destroying unity' within the exiled government, but also amongst the politicians in 
Athens. George II's stubborn attitude towards his rebellious constituents drew the ire of his British allies. Reginald 
Leeper, ambassador from Britain, telegrammed the British Foreign Office that the king was "playing with a fire", as 
he was endangering the interests of both the monarchy and his country as a whole.[6] 
The EAM realized the danger of a united front between politicians in Athens and the Greek government in Cairo and 
acted in an attempt to take advantage of the lack of communication between the exiled government and the one 
still in Athens. However, if the remnants of Greek monarchial and republican power in the homeland could be 
coordinated with the exiled monarchy in Egypt, the communists' mission in Northern Greece would ultimately fail. 
Therefore, an easy way to assure its success was to infiltrate an organization with power and a population 
sympathetic to the cause: the Greek Army. The attempts to counter this strategy became prevalent in the months 
to come, and also became a constant consideration by skeptical republicans during negotiations. One of the most 
affected units of EAM's early infiltration was the Second Field Regiment, in which a number of officers and over 200 
men declared their support of the Political Committee of National Liberation. Though members of the Ninth Army 
removed these men from the camp, the downfall of a regiment showed the potential power of the EAM to create 
dissention. For the immediate days following, Greek politicians and ministers at several levels of government 
concurred with the idea that communist infiltration was to blame for the discipline problems in the army.[7] 
Mere days after the initial discoveries of the seditious presence, additional groups allied with the communist cause 
began taking action. On April 5, 1944, 300 soldiers occupied the office of the Greek Provost Marshal in Cairo, and 
only an overwhelming presence by British Forces and Egyptian police convinced the soldiers to 
evacuate.  Additionally, a Merchant Marine seaman named Karayiannis barricaded himself, along with thirty 
supporters, inside his own home and defied demands by police to disperse.  Troubled by these developments, 
Churchill discussed this issue with General Henry Wilson. One idea called for a Greek Brigade to be sent without 
vehicles to assist in the Allied offensive in Italy, as the Balkan soldiers were incredibly vulnerable to contamination 
by revolutionary elements. The efforts made by the Greek communists did not go unseen to the rest of the world, 
as the Soviet Union spoke well of the EAM-ELAS efforts, as well as condemned Zervas for being the instigator of the 
civil war and an obstacle to any agreements or negotiations on topics like a united command.[8] 
By April 8, 1944, the situation had deteriorated, with the first individual Greek Naval ship refusing to obey 
operational orders. Several reports confirmed that soldiers from the Greek Brigade had taken up defensive positions 
around their camp and showed no signs of letting up without force. As the British realized the extent by which the 
dissention had spread throughout the ranks, General Wilson warned Churchill that dispatching Greek units to Italy 
would be a risk to other elements in the Allied forces, like the Polish and Yugoslavs.[9] 
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Four days later, Greek and British authorities began to contemplate stern action in an effort to curb the subversive 
behavior. One idea was to take violent steps to quell the Mutiny, but the War Cabinet concluded that United States 
media outlets would view this less favorably. The same officials stipulated an idea to issue a joint statement from all 
three of the World War II Allies in support of Great Britain, but it did not amount to much progress.  Finally, by April 
14th, the lack of supplies had taken its toll on the barricaded soldiers and resistance grew less resolute with the 
passing days, and Churchill himself rejected assistance from the Americans or Soviets. In other words, the Prime 
Minister still believed that Great Britain possessed the ability to dictate policy independent of the other World War 
II allies. To prevent these kinds of events from reoccurring, Churchill went as far as telling his Commander-in-Chief 
of Mediterranean forces to fire on mutineers whenever necessary, as no officers or sailors had any right to meddle 
in the formation of the new government. It did not prevent every case, as infantry and tanks were needed as late as 
April 23 to capture Greek posts on the high ground of camps that had been supplied with heavy weapons.[10] 
However, since the root of the protests in Greece was the unwillingness of the king to act in support of his people's 
republican aspirations, Prime Minister Tsouderos believed that this rebellion was Republican in nature, though 
communist in motivation. By the end of the ordeal, George II caved to pressures and created a new government. 
Nonetheless, this chaos unveiled the true lack of control both King George II Churchill's government had over the 
political turmoil that would plague the Greek people for the coming years.  Churchill called for his Allies to help in 
the countering of the internal strife that gave aid to the EAM after this lack of control was realized.  Great Britain, in 
defense of their Greek ally, assured nations like the United States that King George II still represented and served his 
people. While this mutiny in Egypt did not cripple the ability of the British government to execute its goals in the 
Middle East, the Greek Crisis was an early indication that the British would not be able to accomplish their goals 
without any resistance. Additionally, the diversity of people within Egypt sympathetic to the communist cause 
foreshadowed the larger problem that would occur in Greece mere months later. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact 
that German forces began to retreat from their Greek holdings, the militant wings of the Communist Party remained, 
and succeeded in becoming a dangerous hindrance to the political will of Churchill.  However, it was evident that 
Great Britain still maintained the political will to execute its own ideals, as others did not view this incident with any 
level of grave importance. By December, when the chaos of Egypt would transfer to the Greek homeland, this British 
feeling of control would start to be replaced by foreign council, and in the following months, intervention.[11] 
Despite the successful conclusion of the April Crisis in Egypt, tensions between the communists and republicans 
remained. Their disagreements remained in the political arena, as continued requests were made by the KKE and 
EAM to be included in a new Greek government. As German forces withdrew from Greece, the ELAS began to take 
control over large areas of the countryside while the British settled into Athens with the Papandreou government. 
On December 3, 1944, the situation erupted into a period of violence, known as the Dekemvriana, which became 
the central focus of Allied efforts inside the nation. By the time British forces counteracted this violence, the damage 
to their mission had been done, as dissent from international and domestic sources had a greater influence on the 
future of Greece than before.  
In the months that led up to the violence, an important focus of the Papandreou government was the disarmament 
of communist partisans. Domestic guerillas like the Sacred Band and the Third Mountain Brigade were exempt from 
this, a policy that provided a quandary for the leadership of the EAM. While some of the KKE, which included the 
EAM and ELAS, viewed the British as liberators, they raised concerns in regards to the perceived lack of protection 
that communists would have against armed right wing militias. A counterproposal was devised by the KKE that called 
for the complete disarmament of all paramilitary groups in Greece, right and left leaning alike.  Papandreou rejected 
this plan, and British General Ronald Scobie, in charge of the British forces in Greece, called for an immediate end to 
the ELAS. The KKE immediately called for the organization-wide resistance, as the control of the ELAS represented a 
great source of strength for the Greek communist party. To the Allies, the British reaction confused them, given all 
the British had done to ensure Greek prosperity in the future. In the months prior they had forced out the German 
army and provided food, clothing, supplies, and a limited, friendly military presence. Churchill saw these efforts as 
supporting the UNRRA, or United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, to ensure the nation's 
rehabilitation. Additionally, at a time when tensions were at their peak, Panpadreou's government included willing 
parties from all ideologies of the political spectrum.[12] 
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Nevertheless, the frictions which divided pro-monarchy and anti-monarchy factions became irreconcilable. To many 
within the communist and labor parties, the favoritism shown towards right leaning groups, despite their history of 
violence, put leftist ministers and leaders at a severe disadvantage. Additionally, the British officials displayed this 
same bias, which left few alternative solutions. Attempts to finalize disarmament resulted in the retirement of six 
government ministers who associated with the EAM. The Greek communist party then decided to move away from 
Athens into the north of the country.  After he conceded to internal pressure, Scobie allowed a demonstration to be 
held in Athens on December 3, 1944. About 200,000 people filled the streets and gunshots were fired without 
warning.  According to Geoffrey Hoare of The Times, "Seeds of civil war were well and truly sown by the Athens 
police this morning...the police opened fire with rifles and tommy guns.  The firing was wild and savage and 
continued sporadically for nearly an hour."[13] On the other hand, some British individuals believed that EAM 
agitators purposely fired on the protesters in order to organize the Greek people against Scobie, and by extension 
the monarchy. At the end of the initial shooting, more than 25 civilians were dead and hundreds injured.[14] 
Most of the fighting that occurred during this period centered around Athens and its surrounding areas and ports. 
On the night of December 4th, British army officials became aware of advancing ELAS forces through a series of 
telegrams. One such communication informed the army staff that communists came within one hundred yards of 
the Greek center of government early in the violence. Considering these grave circumstances, Churchill sent a 
message to his general on the best ways to counter this threat.  First, he stated that the British soldiers should resist 
the armed, male fighters, but be wary of the women and children used to cover their retreats at times.  Also, the 
armor advantage possessed by Scobie should be utilized frequently as an intimidation tool.  Ultimately, the telegram 
ended with the stern message, "We have to hold and dominate Athens.  It would be a great thing for you to succeed 
in this without bloodshed if possible, but also, with bloodshed if necessary."[15] 
Although they possessed the advantage in training and technology, the British and Greek defenders were caught off-
guard and were unable to halt the initial advances of the ELAS. According to British sources, almost all of the police 
stations in Athens and the Piraeus had been occupied or stormed by ELAS forces. Additionally, they had seized most 
of Athens and surrounded the city center, which left a condensed area by which allied soldiers could rally for a 
counter-attack.  Despite the ELAS' progress, the EAM made up the larger portion of resistance. Churchill wrote to 
Harry Hopkins, "I never knew EAM would be so powerful".[16] In response, Scobie transferred elements of the 
4th Infantry Division from Italy to help repel the EAM from Athens. Even by December 11, more than a full week after 
the outbreaks of violence, Field Marshall Alexander reported that not only were his men exhausted, but lacked a 
foothold in the city as well as the Piraeus harbor and airfield, preventing the distribution of much needed 
supplies.[17] 
As the fight for the capital continued, a new factor complicated Great Britain's efforts: America's influence. While 
the Soviet Union kept to its agreement from the previous months, the United States press shifted public opinion 
against the British. As early as December 10, Churchill wrote concerned telegrams to President Roosevelt with the 
observation that, if there was validity to the claims that the United States condemned British action in Greece, the 
resistance against the EAM organization would be severely hampered. To the dismay of the prime minister, these 
fears were partially realized when Roosevelt responded three days later that he was anxious to help in the situation, 
but acknowledged the relative power of public feeling and opinion. While later action by the United States involved 
a more hands-on approach in the future of Greece, this example had an equivalent effect. Although communications 
during this period of the Dekemvriana demonstrated a separation in interests between two allies, it also placed 
Great Britain in the position of reliance. Above many other factors, the Churchill's government felt besieged by the 
media, and American assurances to the global community of the justness of their policies in Greece would remove 
politics as an obstacle.  At this point, the requests did not reach the level of material intervention, yet public support 
had the ability to yield similar benefits. While Scobie alone could win the mission of communist expulsion, the idea 
that Churchill and Britain wished for American help was one that would reappear many times.[18] 
The British soldiers in Greece understood the turn of public opinion against them, and attempted to convince others 
of the misrepresentations in the press.  In the Censorship Summary for the Week ending on December 16, an 
unnamed general remarked that despite the criticisms, he and his men were "full backing up...of Mr. Churchill's 
policy".[19] However, American sources, such as The New York Times confirmed that Aneurin Bevan and Seymour 
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Cocks of the British Labor Party threatened a major divide within British society if support against "Greek Patriots" 
resumed. An unidentified NCO on the ground urged the recipient of his letter to not draw any conclusions from the 
papers, as the Prime Minister possessed a greater understanding of the situation then any reporter. An additional 
officer echoed a valid concern about the press, as he identified the fact that communists who were in combat with 
the British believed that American popular opinion was on their side, which increased their motivation. The label of 
freedom fighters could not be justified when they used young children in the front of protests as shield, echoed a 
different officer.[20] These sentiments were not isolated feelings, as almost three dozen separate statements of 
similar sentiment were collected in one week alone, which displayed a level of uniform agreement between the 
officers and the enlisted that the story reported in periodicals like the Times were different than what individuals on 
the ground experienced.[21] 
line-height:115%'>Another issue that emerged from the Dekemvriana concerned the plebiscite and future of the 
Greek government. With George II in Egypt and the Papandreou government unable to maintain civic order, British 
authorities began to look for alternatives that would facilitate a stable transition to peace. Ministers such as Ronald 
Leeper and Harold MacMillan opted for the appointment of center-left Archbishop Damaskinos as regent, who 
garnered wide support from all parties, including the communists. Nevertheless, George II was not convinced of the 
popular choice of the archbishop as the head of the regency and cited a lack of reliability in MacMillan's findings. 
While this issue was far from resolved by the end of violence in January 1945, the intensification of these discussions 
at this point signaled part of the British strategy to rebuild Greece, not in their image, but by the desires and for the 
benefit of the people.[22] 
With the ceasefire on January 15, 1945, a great drain on the resources of the British Army ended, and its effects 
were to be felt for months to come. First, the fight against the ELAS-EAM impacted other World War II fronts, as 
75,000 soldiers needed to fight the remaining German Army had to be deployed to Athens. Additionally, the 
portrayal of the Communists as sympathetic freedom fighters in the press handicapped Great Britain's ability to call 
upon the United States for aid. Conversely, another side effect of the increased exposure of Greece to the American 
public was the greater attention of President Roosevelt and his government to the situation, a fact that became 
more important in the following months. Ultimately, the Dekemvriana represented the beginning of challenges for 
the British in terms of their ability to continue to shape Greece in their singular vision.[23] 
Besides the failure of the British government to contain the military potential of the EAM and ELAS, the intrusion, or 
perceived intrusion, of foreign interests in the region created a powerful obstacle for Winston Churchill and his 
advisors. Several decisions highlighted the potential for foreign influence to dictate or alter the policy in Greece and 
put the British Prime Minister in a difficult position. There was little precedence in British foreign policy on how to 
address and work with the suggestions of more powerful nations, as well as dealing with multinational scrutiny. As 
had been the case in the several proceeding decades, the Soviet Union was consistently a consideration when it 
came to Eastern European affairs. Given the geographical proximity of Greece to the Balkan nations, as well as the 
nature of communist expansion that followed the Red Army triumphs in World War II, Churchill would be forced to 
heed the potential of the Soviet Union to create turbulence in the region.  With the ending of the war becoming 
more inevitable, Britain began to notice how the different spheres of influence were taking shape.  
As the spread of Russian form communism affected many nations throughout the Balkans, the development of the 
ideology in Greece differed from their neighbors.  Organizations like the EAM, though communist, did not receive 
the assistance from Soviet sources to "communize" the peninsula. Instead, the Russians preferred to utilize the 
Yugoslavian, Albanian, and Greek movements in order to gain ideological influence in Southeastern Europe. The 
general hesitancy of the Soviet Union to publicly support groups like the EAM ended in August of 1944, as they came 
out backing the Greek communists and criticizing British policy in the region. Churchill and his staff realized that 
despite agreements of the Lebanon Conference, which helped absorb EAM and other communists into an all-party 
government, many things could go wrong and allow the Soviet Union to return.  Alternative plans included 
partnerships with communists hostile to the Soviets, like Tito in Yugoslavia.  While the constant fight for political 
positioning was not unique to this time period, Great Britain's ability to bargain with Russia was directly hampered 
by their decline in political power; a position largely unfamiliar to the British of the previous hundred year period.[24] 
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As the Dekemvriana took its toll on British confidence, Churchill voiced his disdain and fear over the growing 
communist sphere to Field Marshall Smuts.  Churchill wrote, "If the powers of evil should prevail in Greece, as is 
quite likely, we must prepare for a quasi-Bolshevized Russian-led Balkans peninsula, and this may spread to Italy and 
Hungary."[25] Despite reports from sources in the previous months that the Russians maintained little interest in 
the region, even to the extent that the Greek Communist Party was not given representation in Moscow, Churchill 
was not convinced that this guaranteed the cessation of Russian interference. Instead, he cited the fact that the 
Communist and Left Wing within the nation had began to garner the sympathy of the international community, 
including the American media.[26] 
However, by February of the following year, the British government believed that the need to feel threatened by 
Soviet influence was gone. The British cabinet reported, "Premier Stalin had most scrupulously respected his 
acceptance of our position in Greece...He understood that the emissary sent to the U.S.S.R by the Greek Communists 
had first been put under the arrest".[27] The spirit of mutually assured cooperation continued, as the idea of spheres 
of influence returned to the negotiations. To ensure a lack of interference by the Russians in Greece specifically, the 
British agreed to allow Soviet influence to assume control over other British interests in the region, such as the 
nations of Bulgaria and Romania. Nevertheless, part of the negotiations included that Joseph Stalin could send 
observers to the region in order to confirm that an anti-communist leader, like the right leaning General Plastiras, 
could not establish a right wing dictatorship.[28] 
Despite the fact that the Soviet Union had less influence in the Greek affairs than in other parts of Europe by the end 
of March 1945, Churchill and his advisors remained suspicious. For instance, the British Foreign Secretary felt that 
the easiest way for a prolonged civil war to emerge in Greece would be for the USSR to back a claim for the ELAS to 
have an equal say in the formation of the Greek Army. Churchill, who sent a letter to President Roosevelt that asked 
if it was prudent to include the Russians on the economic missions, also spoke to this suspicion. More important 
than the content of the request by Churchill was that he had to consult another superpower in order to both validate 
his country's concerns, as well as seek approval for future actions. Nonetheless, cooperation with a power destined 
to be adversarial for decades suggested a feeling of disparity and uncertainty by the British, a feeling that can be 
attributed to a newfound realization of secondary status. [29] 
While the threat of Soviet sway over Greece seemed to diminish, the United States consistently attempted to insert 
their ideas into the rebuilding of Greece, from proposed political changes to the reorganization of the army. 
Nonetheless, the fact that Churchill was forced to consider the American position on many aspects of Greek 
organization he found important was an indicator of the increasing levels of influence others had on the 
reconstruction of the British ally. While this became evident as soon as the Egyptian Mutiny in April, the events of 
the Dekemvriana polarized opinions abroad on the correct manner to handle Greece.  Communications between 
Churchill and President Roosevelt on the topic of Greece followed the British decision to intervene in the affairs of 
their ally, and Churchill and presidential advisor Harry Hopkins debated on American assistance as early as December 
10. Concerned with the prospect of fighting the communists alone, Churchill wrote, "If it can be said in the streets 
of Athens that the United States are against us, then more British blood will be shed and much more 
Greek."[30] Despite the fact that the American media had been sympathetic to the ELAS cause, the leaders of Britain 
needed unity with their powerful ally in order to avoid further devastation of military and political capital. The next 
day, a private letter from Churchill to Hopkins further pleaded for America to support Great Britain.[31] 
Relief came in the form of a telegram from Roosevelt, which reassured Churchill that the friendship between the 
two nations still existed. However, while Roosevelt had sympathy for the situation in Greece, the power of pressing 
circumstances, such as the sway of public opinion, prevented a suitable intervention. Besides negative reactions in 
regards to the ELAS, rumors of Britain giving territorial concessions in Poland to the Soviet Union caused protests as 
well. It is at this point that American representatives voiced some of the first calls for King George II to establish a 
regency.[32] 
Despite Roosevelt's hesitancy to act, Churchill continued to write about the military challenges that faced Greece, 
only resisted by the British.  According to a telegram written on December 17, at a time when primary focus was 
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recapturing the port of Piraeus and the city of Athens, British General Staff Intelligence found that after more than 
a week of fighting, no more than 12,000 ELAS remained, but they took a heavy toll on the civilian population.[33] 
As the violence dissipated, the discussion between the United States and Great Britain shifted from assistance on 
the military front to more political ideals. By December 26, Churchill assured Roosevelt that with the violence 
lessening, it must always be understood that he, and the country, sought nothing from Greece, in territory or 
advantages. Nevertheless, the need for Churchill to justify the validity of his country's actions suggests that their 
allies were beginning to take a larger and more vocal role in Greece's future, which still had British troops on the 
ground. As discussions began in regards to the appointment of a regent due to the lack of a plebiscite, Churchill 
made the British position clear. First, he supported Archbishop Damaskinos and urged Roosevelt to agree with his 
thinking, especially given the fact that Damaskinos's rapport with the EAM had the potential to lead to quick 
negotiations and forgo civil war.[34] 
With agreements signed by Communist and pro-Republican representatives in February, the British began to heavily 
focus on rebuilding Greece into a stable power. These decisions, which included the reformation of the Greek army 
and the extent of economic aid, consistently included discussions that analyzed the American perspective.  For 
example, in a War Cabinet conclusion from March 12, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that 
General Scobie was hesitant of informing the United States government of goals to reduce the military commitment 
to Greece. Primarily, Scobie was concerned that the Americans would decide to inject themselves in that role of 
Greece's savior, and take the credit for their rescue. However, the Secretary became less skeptical of cooperation in 
terms of financial and economic aid. These kinds of considerations were typical of this period in Britain's relationship 
with Greece, as many discussions regarding the economics of Greek restoration increasingly involved American aid 
or resources as at least a factor, if not the driving force behind the different plans to be implemented in the coming 
months.[35] 
The distrust of the Soviet Union became apparent in the debate over the American role in the economic recovery 
effort. In his April 3 correspondence with Roosevelt, Churchill suggested a joint Anglo-American committee for the 
benefit of the Greek government that would allow for two advisors from each nation to have close proximity to the 
Greeks.  Nonetheless, a central idea seemed to be that the British did not want American interests, especially 
business, to be left unchecked. Despite the suspicion, Churchill urged the assistance of Donald M. Nelson, former 
executive vice president of Sears Roebuck. Later, Roosevelt confirmed that the Greek government had informally 
approached the US about a similar idea, but he was going to reject it at that time, as the preferred group for the 
UNRRA was better equipped for this task. It was not increasingly clear by this point in Churchill's administration, the 
power the British had over the future of their ally seemed contingent on the ideas and preferences of the United 
States..[36] 
While the potential influences of the Soviet Union and United States had an undeniable effect on the course of 
British intervention in Greece, there were certain internal issues throughout this period that became significant to 
the British and the Greeks. The conclusion of the Dekemvriana allowed for a relatively uninterrupted opportunity to 
act on specific goals, originating from needs that became apparent when sections of Athens were under siege.  First 
of all, Churchill realized that the political origins of the tensions within Greece could be addressed through satisfying 
the popular demand of a plebiscite and free elections. Additionally, as the problems of relying on militias became 
apparent, a debate emerged as to the extent that the British army would be involved in the country. Though the 
need for a governmental alternative to King George II and his minister began as early as the previous April, the 
Dekemvriana brought to the attention of many within Churchill's government the need for a plebiscite. It became 
clear that in order to avoid a similar outbreak of violence in the future, a leader had to be elected that would speak 
to a wider array of people, not just British interests, while the king remained in exile. An early nomination by the 
British for the new government was Archbishop Damaskinos of Athens, despite the vocal protests of the existing 
Papandreou administration. The main apprehension was the comfort the Archbishop had with members of the EAM, 
an asset some feared would be used against the existing ministers. Nevertheless, an early compromise initially 
explored was the formation of a regency of three, which would consist of Damaskinos as the figurehead.[37] 
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Both the Greeks and British understood that the appointment of a regent needed to be tolerated by George II. 
Initially, this task proved to be difficult, as the Greek king vehemently disagreed with the notion that Damaskinos 
constituted a wish of the people.  In fact, he referred to the potential of the Archbishop's appointment as, "An 
abandonment of the struggle," and would create confusion on the front to the extreme left.[38]In addition, the 
Greek Constitution stated that in the event that the king could not be present in the country to rule within his 
government, the Crown Prince would be appointed regent.  In a letter to Churchill, the Greek monarch stated, "I 
have never solicited anyone's help to safeguard my Throne and you know...how wronged I am by those who think I 
would wish to rely on anything other than the will of my people".[39]  Members of the Greek government, such as 
Minister A. Alexandris, believed that the internal conditions of Greece did not make the appointment of the regency 
necessary, as the consequences would result in a victory for the otherwise dilapidated communists.  This position 
became a contentious issue, up to the eventual capitulation by George II in the upcoming weeks.[40] 
The submission by the King came due to the accumulated weight of political pressure by the British, as well as 
representatives within Greece. An early example came from prominent centrist Greek politician Themistoklis 
Sofoulis, who sent a telegram, with support of many politicians, that not only endorsed the appointment of the 
Archbishop, but strongly advised the King to agree.  Additional pressure came from Churchill himself, who, in a 
communication with President Roosevelt, commented that he "had to tell the King that if he did not agree the matter 
would be settled without him and that we should recognize the new government instead of him".[41] The threat of 
the instillation of a government against the wishes of the nation's ruler harkened to an imperial mindset of Britain, 
the very threat of which motivated George II to act against his own beliefs. However, this display of British power 
and influence would not be replicated in this fashion many more times during Churchill's administration.[42] 
The politics evolved as violence in the capital began to subside. An egregious error was printed by the Greek press 
soon after the New Year, which stipulated that not only was the Archbishop unwilling to allow EAM representation 
in the new government, but he would also lend a willing ear to the ideas of the king. The repercussions of this 
statement had grave potential, with a misunderstanding with the United States being the most troublesome of all. 
Eden and Leeper argued that the Papandreou government was responsible for the misrepresentation, and urged the 
king to not share any communications of that caliber with anyone but the regent. The Greek monarch's lack of 
enthusiasm continued to be a hindrance for Churchill's government, yet their faith in the potential of Damaskinos 
allowed them to continue in their goal for a democratic Greece.[43] 
Nevertheless, progress was made and the popularity of the temporary government spread. Thesuccess prompted 
ideas of additional plebiscites in liberated areas, even in the north, where a conceivable attempt could be made by 
the ELAS to seize power through a democratic process. While the British did not perceive the success in a similar 
manner as the Greeks, Leeper and Churchill encouraged a potential plebiscite of confidence in the Archbishop's 
government in all the liberated areas. A successful display of confidence could reinforce the authority of Damaskinos, 
and by extension, legitimize the goals of the British. From this point in January until the end of Churchill's time as 
prime minister, the continuation of free elections was an issue of paramount importance, as it symbolized a large 
victory over communist forces.[44] 
Thesuccess of British policies in the country partially relied on the ability of soldiers to ensure a repeat of the 
Dekemvriana did not occur. During the month long period of violence, the British army had to divert much needed 
resources to combat the communists, a luxury not available if a similar situation emerged. Additionally, Republican 
forces, such as the EDES, were controversial for their extreme methods and therefore could not be solely relied 
upon. George II recognized the sacrifice of the Englishmen who defended his country, and agreed that the majority 
of them should be allowed to withdraw from Greece as soon as Athens became secure. However, the 
accomplishments of General Scobie could not remain if the Greek army became unable to preserve the newfound 
peace. By January, as the violent communist resistance died down, a discussion arose as to how to purse the goals 
of a self-sufficient Greece when the national armed forces were woefully unprepared to counter another potential 
uprising.  Churchill and the British believed that the first step lay in the ability of the Greeks to defend their own 
nation. According to Cabinet Minutes from January 8, "It was clear that by our action we had prevented a 
massacre.  It was now for the Greek Government which had been established to raise the necessary National 
Forces."[45] Since these goals were accomplished, the next step, according to Field Marshal Alexander, was to 
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establish a military infrastructure to assist in defense, such as a corridor linking the commercial port areas of Patras 
with Athens. These improvements came with a proposed truce by Alexander that would ensure peace through a 
forced and complete disarmament of all irregular forces within Greece.[46] 
Despite the formal signing of the cease-fire at Varkiza in February, the army and national defense remained an issue 
into April and June. In spite of the hope to have a majority of British soldiers withdrawn months' prior, Scobie still 
possessed the responsibilities of advisor to the Greek government, as well as commander of the British garrison. 
However, a communication between Churchill and Roosevelt on April 3, 1945, conveyed the hope that that the 
"operational phase" of the Greek involvement was over, which would allow for the UNRRA to assume responsibility 
for aid distribution instead of the army. Additionally, at this point Churchill welcomed the "continued collaboration" 
of the United States Embassy in Athens. As April became June, the need to solidify a system in preparation for an 
eventual British departure from Greece persisted. The theme of these discussions had not changed, as many 
encouraged a minimal presence of British soldiers while native forces were being prepared. According to the Cabinet, 
the single area in which British council could have the greatest impact was in regards to the military. However, as 
the resources available to the British for Greece lessened, the more economics began to factor into army decisions. 
This was reflected in the advice to train and maintain a national defense force that could only guarantee internal 
security, which would allow neighboring nations like Yugoslavia to posses more imposing forces. A commonality in 
those austerity measures was that American aid helped dictate to what extent the rebuilding could occur, even if 
the British military was in control of the organization, administration, discipline and training. However, these 
measures would diminish the economic and military drain on Great Britain's resources, theoretically allowing them 
to maintain some semblance of control over the resources left in the country. By settling matters early, the British 
would also be able to keep the interested USSR and USA from intervening for a while longer. Despite the need for 
British involvement as advisors, the definitive goal was clearly defined as Greek governmental autonomy.[47] 
While the goals of free elections and military sovereignty were ideas of the Britishfrom the earliest periods of their 
involvement with Greece, an increasing theme became the insertion and consideration of American capabilities. As 
the debates, which surrounded the formation of the Greek army, largely occurred at the end of Churchill's term as 
Prime Minister, the gradual increase of American considerations into the debates was a sign for things to come after 
Churchill's departure. The plebiscite had a similar trend, as a main goal of the British was to appear democratic in 
the face of media scrutiny that saw groups like the EAM as democratic movements of the people. 
Every factor previously discussed, from the Dekemvriana to the intervention of American interests, helped to dictate 
the course of British policy in Greece. The development of these specific interests over the six-month period from 
December 1944 to June 1945 demonstrated a distinct transformation in the nature of Churchill's decisions, reflecting 
an overall decline in the influence of the British nation. The month of December became particularly significant due 
to the fact that many debates over the subsequent months originated specifically during this period. Of the many 
topics that took center stage, the three most significant were the implications of the Dekemvriana on international 
relations, the extent of the British military mission in the country, and the future of a democratically elected Greek 
government. 
The outbreak of the Dekemvriana shocked Greek and British officials alike, as it left them generally unprepared for 
the assault on Athens and Piraeus. The beginning of the ELAS assault on the capital signaled the moment when 
Churchill took direct control of the situation, and Greek preservation became a top priority. In the name of that 
control, Churchill did not wait to consult most of the Cabinet, as the time spent would have potentially delayed the 
assistance Greece needed. In other words, Winston Churchill made it abundantly clear that the security of the Balkan 
nation was not only a national issue, but one of personal importance as well. However, even as early as December 
5 1944, United States Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr. began to make observations on the different policy 
approaches to Greek preservation by the United States and Great Britain.[48] 
At the same time as the statement by Stettinius, Churchill addressed the House of Commons on the events that had 
developed in recent days, as well as the clear goals and aspirations of his government. This speech was published in 
the New York Times, as the American public had begun to take interest in what was happening in Greece. According 
to Churchill, the civil war was just one facet of the hardships facing the nation, which included economic and financial 
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problems that the United States and Great Britain together would work out. This statement's importance stemmed 
from the fact that although Greece had been an interest of British, the inclusion of American support was now 
needed to convince some of the Greek cause. Nevertheless, the greatest obstacle became the extent force would 
be used to correct the woes of civil strife. Churchill urged the House of Commons that in these violent times, the 
burden fell on the Allied military sphere to use force in order to prevent greater bloodshed. The armed force would 
be dependent on the Greek government, since private armies owed allegiance to an ideology.[49] 
Although this British position was theorized earlier than the publication date, The New York Times published a cable 
on December 17 that identified the American position on Greece at the time. According to the United States War 
Department, the US military would be strictly limited to relief and rehabilitation.  In addition, "American personnel 
assigned to Greece...are not authorized to participate, directly or indirectly, in any operational phase."[50] American 
combat soldiers within the vicinity of wartime operations were told to refrain from any activity that could be 
conceived as intervention, an unpopular idea in the United States. This idea would continue to be important in the 
Anglo-American relationship, as the place for Allied troops in a country like Greece would remain a subject of debate 
between the World War II allies.[51] 
Many in the United States did not embrace the case for British intervention. The same day that the text of Churchill's 
speech was published in The New York Times, an article appeared on page 11advocating for a strong US intervention 
in spite of the efforts by Great Britain.  Basil Vlavianos, head of the Greek section of the International Editorial Board 
of the Free World Association and editor of the Greek Newspaper, The National Herald, wrote, "Monarchist forces 
wanting the return of King George are behind the present effort to divide Greece and unfortunately they are backed 
by the British."[52]  To Vlavianos, the British support of the hereditarily related monarch symbolized the policy's 
effect on the spheres of influence. These spheres were responsible for the potential of reactionary forces, like the 
EDES, supported by foreign interests who wished to master the situation. Therefore, the postulation that the 
resistance movements were solely communistic in nature was a farce. Outspoken criticism of Greek intervention 
from the United States grew as the fighting in Athens continued. The collective domestic criticism had a noticeable 
effect on the United States government, as Roosevelt wrote to Churchill that while he would have liked to assist 
public opinion in the nation made that prospect unlikely.[53]  
In many of the criticisms of Churchill's policy, a common question regarded the political future of Greece, including 
the selection of a group to replace the unpopular Papandreou government. By December 1944, the threat of non-
inclusion for communists in the post-Nazi government led some to question the true democratic nature of Greek 
leadership, and any role Great Britain would play in its selection. According to Churchill, "Whether the Greek people 
form themselves into a monarchy or republic is for their decision. Whether they form a government of the right or 
left is for their decision."[54] The job of the British at the time was to ensure, through deployment of the Army, that 
law and order could be maintained. The assurance of stability would allow for the people of Athens, and Greece as 
a whole, to be more prepared to vote on their future. This stance was believed to garner the support of the majority 
of the Greek population. Churchill declared that Great Britain, under the proxy leadership of General Scobie, would 
take care that the government would not attach itself to any specific faction.[55]    
However, the use of British force to ensure free elections led to many objections in the House.  One of the voices of 
dissent came from Laborite F.E. Pethic Lawrence, who asked if Churchill could assure the House that, if the armed 
forces of Britain and the Allies supported the government, they would enforce the need for governmental change 
and not just preserve the status quo with European military backing. This question addressed two key issues of the 
time, the place of free elections as well as how the presence of the military could influence the future of Greece. 
Towards the conclusion of the speech, Lawrence challenged the prime minister to assure members of Parliament 
that his government would remind the Greeks that, despite present hostilities, all political identifications needed to 
be included in the elections. Ultimately, the concerns within the dissenting members originated from a fear that 
increased intervention would resemble an imperial mindset, a course the country would be unable to pursue, due 
to both economic restrictions, as well as unwillingness from public opinion. In the coming months, especially after 
the Treaty of Varkiza, the issue of communist inclusion would resonate for survivors of the December violence and 
became a contentious issue for the emergent government. For both, their December introduction to members of 
Parliament displayed the level of importance the administration assigned to this issue.[56] 
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As the violence continued throughout December, different statements were made as to how to classify the British 
military response. Papandreou stated, according to the minister in charge of Greek Information Services, Nicholas 
Lely, that he was against the use of force as much by the Right as on the Left. However, what that statement did not 
convey was any view of the 5,000 soldiers within the country as intervention. According to Papandreou on December 
7, 1944, "British assistance to us is not intervention.  Intervention exists when it takes place in free nations where 
public sovereignty functions...When a people, however, have not gained political liberty...it is not intervention; it is 
then liberation."[57]Therefore, if Greece possessed an army that did not consist of factions of conflicted interests, 
the sacrifice of the Allies would not have been necessary. Nevertheless, the leader of the recently liberated Greek 
nation confirmed the ideas perpetuated by Churchill: the British army's role was not of an occupying force, but to 
liberate and ensure the democratic process could continue uninhibited.[58] 
The last month of 1944 held great significance for the development of British political power. Violence and anarchy 
in the streets of Athens caused many of the core ideals of the Greek protection to be questioned by foreign media, 
as well as by the local government. Nonetheless, many of the issues raised would reappear consistently throughout 
the next six months. Some, like the place of the British military, remained contentious throughout the remainder of 
Churchill's time as Prime Minister. Others, such as the place of free elections and sovereignty, became a staple of 
the United States policy towards Greece, as their voice in the matter became stronger and more influential. 
As the debates on the future of Greece continued, influenced by factors such as the media and political pressure, 
the month of January 1945 proved to be one in which Churchill was able to make his ideas and convictions on these 
discussions known.  Through his speeches, such as his address to the House of Commons, the prime minister was 
able to address his critics and give them all reason to support the continual effort to ensure the safety of the Balkan 
nation. The discussions on improvement were paired with noticeable progress in many of the controversial areas 
that generated criticism, such as the persuasion of King George II over the plebiscite issue and the formation of a 
truce to end the violence within the capital. Nevertheless, the negotiations and steps taken during this period would 
become unique, as they represented an end to the time when Greece was shaped under the sole vision of the British. 
With the arrival of the New Year, the formulation of a truce between government and communist forces became 
imperative. For Churchill, success of this goal would have the potential to turn opponents in both the media and 
Parliament over to his side. As early as January 2, 1945, American media sources began to notice the efforts of the 
British Prime Minister to facilitate a cessation of the month long fight. According to the anonymous author of a New 
York Times article entitled "Greek Regency", Churchill's interventionist strategy revealed the advantages of "grasping 
the Greek nettle firmly."[59]  The grasp referred to the initiative taken in order to ensure the beginning of talks 
between many of the warring party leaders, excluding the remnants of royalist forces. However, the success of the 
future of negotiations depended on the skills of Archbishop Damaskinos to facilitate a representative administration. 
The initial reports presented by this media source did not yet show a willingness of the EAM or ELAS to negotiate 
with Scobie, but initial progress was clear.[60] 
At the same time, the debate surrounding the plebiscite continued, as King George II remained a key obstacle for 
unilateral support of the Archbishop and his government.  As previously mentioned, a problem arose with the release 
of misleading documents from the Greek government, that amongst other inaccuracies, stated that Damaskinos, 
"Did not intend to allow E.A.M to be represented in the New Government, and that the Regent would be in close 
contact with the King."[61]An additional misnomer from this release was the supposed relationship the regent 
sought with the king, which meant that the monarchy would wield considerable influence in future decision making. 
For members of the communist groups, their contempt for the king was not the only reason why this prospect 
concerned them. With a cessation of violence in the relative future for Greece, a concern arose as the possibility 
that, despite their role in the violence, they would not be extended an invitation to join the new government.[62] 
In congruence with Winston Churchill's disdain for and confusion over the situation, Minister Anthony Eden 
identified a crucial problem. Prime Minister Papandreou leaked the telegram, against the clearly expressed wishes 
of Damaskinos, who decided that he had to carry out the king's previous discussions. However, progress seemed to 
have been made, as Eden continued to state in the telegram to Leeper that George II admitted the inaccuracies 
within the leak, as well as the fact that the blind loyalty of Papandreou seemed odd. In his effort to ease the job of 
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the Archbishop, Eden recommended that the King be given explicit instructions to not send messages to anyone but 
the Regent, and, "It must be of a character to help him in his task and not hinder him."[63] For Churchill, Eden and 
the rest of the Cabinet, a small victory in this power struggle came when George II of Greece understood and agreed 
to not deliberately stand in the Archbishop's way, though he held little enthusiasm.[64] 
Nonetheless, by January 07, under political pressure, the British sponsored Georgios Papandreou resigned and was 
replaced by 62-year-old Liberal Party's Nicholas Plastiras. He pledged that his new government would, amongst other 
things, impose legal order, punish the collaborators of the German occupation, and assist in food and shelter 
distribution. Despite Plastiras' attempt to distance himself from the British, ELAS leaders at the time did not accept 
a ceasefire due to Scobie's failure to confirm the Government's intent to disarm right wing militia groups at the same 
time as the communists. The hesitancy over potential favoritism persisted despite the fact that one or more EAM 
members were invited to take leadership positions at newly elected posts in the Cabinet.  Additionally, unease still 
centered on the British idea to maintain a stable and strong military presence within Greece until a national defense 
force could be raised. However, the estimated time for withdrawal was still four months away, according to 
Churchill.  Though the retreat of ELAS forces hinted at the beginning of serious negotiations, several sources, 
including the Manchester Times, questioned the motives of both Plastiras and the British in the request for a 
ceasefire, as speculations were made from sympathetic onlookers that the ELAS would not continue to fight if not 
for "a powerful cause."[65] 
Although Churchill wrote that he believed the ELAS was driven off by force of arms, it was the resolution of an issue 
within the conflict that lead to great headway and an eventual ceasefire: the release of communist hostages. In his 
speech to Parliament more than a week later, the prime minister highlighted the grave situation for many. At the 
conclusion of the Greek section of the speech, he told the story of a British officer named Colonel Morrow. He 
described a column of hostages being led away from Athens on Christmas Day, with individuals dying every day on 
the march from starvation and exposure. When these prisoners finished the journey to the ELAS-controlled camps 
in the north, no one provided food. After a considerable time, some of the soldiers raised a hundred dollars, which 
bought only a half loaf of bread. Additionally, the Colonel heard stories about political prisoners who were being 
shot and robbed, as were protesters.[66] 
The address was not the first time the Prime Minister's administration addressed the issue of treatment of political 
hostages. However, by January 12, close to the signing of the truce between the Communists and the British, British 
negotiators believed that this singular issue could not be the hindrance to a lasting peace. This revelation was made 
to the concern of both the regent and General Plastiras, as the Archbishop informed the ELAS representative of his 
profound shock. General Scobie urged the Greek leaders that their anger over the issue was not ignored, as British 
civilians were also taken during the violence. As Leeper and other members of the War Cabinet wished for the 
cessation of violence to come, a recommendation was released which stated, "The release of these hostages should 
be accompanied by some guarantee of immunity in the case of persons...who were not guilty of acts contrary to the 
rules of war."[67] Despite this announcement, some discussed the amnesty of General Ares, leader of the ELAS, for 
the sake of national unity, though officials such as the British Foreign Secretary equated it to blackmail. Ultimately, 
despite the terms signed by representatives of the ELAS and British, His Majesty's government made it clear that the 
agreement could not endure into peace unless hostages had been safeguarded or released.[68]  
The formulation of the truce, including an agreement for the gradual release of hostages, set the stage for Prime 
Minister Churchill to champion the cause within the House of Commons. Though it covered many wartime concerns 
on both fronts of World War II, it included a lengthy discussion about the history of the Greek conflict, as well as the 
progress being made. Firstly, the Prime Minister gave an in-depth background on the conflict, as well as a reminder 
that the origin of the British presence in the country was to expel the Nazis. When the British returned to help rebuild 
the liberated nation, both the EDES and EAM alike invited them, and despite the writings of American newspapers, 
went in with "Good gifts in our hands; stability and assistance to the all-Party Greek Govt."[69] Nevertheless, 
Churchill stated that even before the outbreak of violence, he knew not to discount the communist directed ELAS 
and their ability to cause chaos. As violence erupted, the Prime Minister reminded his audience that the communists 
within Greece had tried both political and military means to achieve power, as the entire situation was a struggle for 
power.[70] 
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In spite of Great Britain's hubris, Churchill proudly stated that the eventual victory in Athens was the key to the 
preservation of Greek freedom itself. As part of that freedom, the appointment of the Archbishop was allowed to 
occur relatively unimpeded, with strong anti-communist General Plastiras as Prime Minister. According to the 
speech, these governing efforts were the first step of many to eliminate the rampant backstabbing and back dealing 
between many members of power within the Greek government. An additional challenge, according to Churchill, 
would be the integration of former communists back into the government of the Greek people, as many within the 
nation itself wished for no amnesty or forgiveness. Most importantly, Churchill reinforced for all those who 
witnessed this address the answer to the question of what Britain wanted from Greece. While some speculated the 
involvement of the nation was a move of 'power politics', Churchill cleared any misconceptions with a powerful 
proclamation: "I repeat, we want nothing for Greece but her friendship, and to earn it and to deserve it we have to 
do our duty." For hundreds of thousands of men, women and children to live without fear of murder or pillaging, 
prosperity approached, though at a deliberate pace.[71] 
By the conclusion of the speech, the British representative body voted 340-7 in support of the goals for the 
reconstruction. These goals included the ending of violence within Athens and the surrounding country, as well as 
the solidification of the Archbishop's position and a government loyal to the people as opposed to the monarch.  This 
symbol of support for the goals of Churchill within Greece was the high point for the British, as foreign governments 
and media interests had not forced them to abandon their overall goals for freedom and sovereignty in the Balkan 
state.  
While Churchill enjoyed nominal political success during the month of January 1945, the following three months 
became a time when the British ideas of Greece's future were established. This solidification began as the violence 
that had consumed Southern Greece for over a month officially ended with the Treaty of Varkiza on February 12, 
1945. However, as different policies were envisioned, the influence of outside actors, such as the United States and 
the Soviet Union, became more pronounced.  Therefore, the discussions and debates within the British government 
began to reflect less on the British desires for Greece, and more on the increasingly influential place their World War 
Two allies would have. 
Although an armistice had been reached by January 11, 1945, a formalized ceasefire between the Greek Government 
and the EAM was not finalized until a month later at Varkiza, a suburb of greater Athens. The Greek Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, supported by the British, met with the Secretary of the Greek Communist Party, and among the many 
aspects of this treaty was a guarantee of free elections throughout the country. According to Article IX, a popular 
plebiscite would occur within the year in order to amend any problems within the Greek Constitution, and thus 
create a constituent assembly that would, in turn, draft a new organic law. Additionally, both signatories agreed that 
the World War Two allies of Great Britain would send representatives to verify the elections. Equally important was 
the disarmament of EAM-ELAS, which they agreed to on the condition that the new national army would be one 
without any bias, left or right. Within the next few days, the ELAS surrendered over a hundred different pieces of 
artillery, mortars, machines guns and radios.[72] 
The establishment of peace garnered praise from many Allies within the country.  On February 14, 1945, Prime 
Minister Plastiras addressed a crowd and said, "On behalf of Greece, the Government expresses their deep gratitude 
to her Great Allies and especially to yourself, Mr. Prime Minister...her great friend and supporter."[73] In a manner 
usually reserved for heroes, Plastiras described Churchill as the voice that strengthened the Greek people's 
resistance against the barbarians and animated its fortitude and hope. On the same date, the Archbishop praised 
Winston Churchill for his presence in the country. According to Damaskinos, "The presence...of the British Prime 
Minister among us...giving thus, one more proof of the lively interest of his great country for her friends, 
Greece."[74] Specifically, the Regent of Athens recalled the personal visit of Churchill, during the violence of the 
Dekemvriana, in an attempt to bring about a ceasefire. This personal investment conveyed a guarantee to the Greek 
people that England would honor its commitment to the country, despite the hard times ahead.[75] 
Following his negotiations at Yalta, Churchill reported to The House of Commons on the various decisions and how 
they applied to each country with British interests. In regards to Greece, Churchill referred to his trip to Athens as 
the high spot of the whole journey. He described his trip with Damaskinos through the city center, as crowds of 
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cheering people clogged the streets, which created the greatest protests of its kind ever witnessed by Churchill 
personally. The sight would have been unbelievable to many who had followed the events of the nations through 
the American media, as Churchill stated that there had not "been any on which greater prejudice and 
misrepresentation have been poured out against them in the United States."[76] This prejudice described had the 
undesirable effect of providing enthusiasm for the enemy, like during the violence of the Dekemvriana, when 
American media sources depicted the communist forces as fighting for the freedom of the Greek people. 
Nevertheless, Churchill declared that in spite of this obstacle, the Greek people would look for the job to be done, 
both militarily and politically.[77] 
Despite praise from the leaders of the nation he labored to help, Churchill recognized the need to finalize the place 
of Britain's allies in the rebuilding process. As previously mentioned, the Soviet Union represented a potential 
obstacle to Greek national unification, as Balkan nations such as Macedonia, Romania, and Bulgaria began to identify 
with the communist cause. Despite this, negotiations with the Soviet Union went better than anticipated, as Stalin's 
dislike of the Greek Communists mirrored Churchill's.  As previously mentioned, a Cabinet minute from February 
19th revealed that the emissary from the Greek Communists to the USSR was put under house arrest and sent back 
to Greece. However, as curious as the Soviet's abandoning of the region was, the fact that the expulsion of a 
communist representative from Europe occurred without any noticeable criticism from the Russian media peaked 
Churchill's curiosity.[78] 
As February became March, the view of Soviet inclusion in Greece by the British did not change, but the American's 
began to have their own input. In order to ensure the continued cooperation of the Soviet Union, Great Britain 
agreed to give up their influence in Romania and Bulgaria in exchange for the lead in Greece. Roosevelt questioned 
this decision, as the Soviet Union at this time began to go back on many agreements discussed during the TOLSTOY 
accords, otherwise known as the Fourth Moscow Conference, in which the post-war division of the Balkans became 
a primary discussion point. Nevertheless, the American president proposed the idea of including the Soviet's 
Commissar for Foreign Trade, Anastas Mikoyan, to assist in the consultation on Greek economic potential. Despite 
this move, British and American politicians alike agreed that the Russians could not have any influence in the 
formation of the new Greek national army, as the opposite would result in the resumption of civil distress at the 
hands of the ELAS. April held similar debates, and discussions between the Soviet Union and Great Britain ended 
with similar results; the British defended their ideas of Greek elections and economy, even though the potential of 
Soviet intervention persisted.[79] 
March 1945 also signified a time in which the economic consequences and role of Great Britain in Greece would be 
examined. According to Secretary Macmillan, the extent to which Britain had dedicated resources to the 
reorganization of Greece would require heavy financial and economic commitments for many years to come. 
Initially, Churchill saw the arrangements and actions perpetuated by the United States before the Yalta Agreement 
as justification for a lack of trust in their ability to help. However, Cabinet Minutes from March 6, 1945 asked to 
consider the Yalta Agreement as the superseding document to base the relationship off of, one in which the 
American word initially proved to be reliable. Finally, by March 12, Secretary Macmillan agreed that in order for the 
British vision of Greece to be realized, an increase in military presence would be called for, although it would be 
paired with the beginning of the US government's involvement in terms of financial and economic matters. For the 
benefit of the Churchill, Macmillan assured that the American inclusion into Greece would parallel British policy thus 
far.[80] 
One of the more popular ideas for the financial recovery of Greece was to send a multi-national team of advisors. 
The United States representative would be Donald Nelson, who had just completed a similar non-political mission 
to China, as well as Oliver Lyttelton and the previously mentioned Soviet Commissar of Foreign Trade Mikoyan. 
According to President Roosevelt, this mission would have the added affect of reinforcing a positive world opinion 
of the British effort. Evidence of world involvement was seen in the American media, as The New York Timesran 
articles that called for monetary donations for the people of war-torn Greece. Churchill had mixed views on the 
potential of this project. On one hand, the inclusion of the Soviet Union and the United States, including free access 
to their newspapers, would allow the responsibilities Britain once had to Greece to be largely discharged within a 
matter of months. The American monetary resources would account for such an accelerated time frame. However, 
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the Prime Minister foresaw the United States taking the credit for the success of Greece, despite all Great Britain's 
work.[81] 
Despite this hesitancy about the United States, Churchill wrote to President Roosevelt in the early days of April to 
confirm his hopes for the future of Greece. First, the Prime Minister acknowledged that not only did he not wish to 
include the Russians in the previously discussed economic missions, but also described their potential inclusion as a 
purely political gesture. Therefore, he proposed the formation of an Anglo-American Committee of British and 
American experts. Among those potential experts, Churchill urged Donald Nelson to participate. Ultimately, the 
benefit of the American partnership would be the ability of the British to gradually pass the responsibility for Greece 
onto another in the upcoming future.[82] 
The months of February, March and April thus signified a transitional period of British policy in Greece. While the 
ultimate goal of a democratic Greece remained vital for Churchill and his administration, the way by which this was 
to be achieved differed.  Instead of allies being used as tools for Britain's ultimate gain, communications within the 
British government began to describe potential aid from the United States, and the Soviet Union, as capable of 
replacing the contributions of Churchill's government. The Prime Minister himself acknowledged that it would cause 
British advisors and military to remain in the country for far less time. In turn, correspondence from Roosevelt 
became increasingly valued council; the amount of time before the Americans could potentially resume 
responsibilities in the Balkan nation lessened by political pressure from a primary power onto a lesser one. 
The months of May and June signified the final full months of Churchill's term as Prime Minister. Therefore, it was 
appropriate for the debates that surrounded the Greek nation to involve both Britain's legacy in the nation as well 
as what the Greeks had to do in the future in order to assure success.  Though the Cabinet minutes and telegrams 
from the time did not suggest an immediate withdrawal of the British, discussions occurred as to the ability of the 
Greek government to assume roles previously assisted by their European friends. Nevertheless, as the interests and 
potential contributions of the Allies became more pronounced, the Churchill administration's role became 
increasingly marginalized. This different position epitomized Great Britain's descent from a primary power into a 
secondary one. 
One factor that needed to remain a constant for the successful rebuilding of Greece was a stable government. While 
support for the Archbishop remained a constant, the Prime Ministers remained volatile in terms of support of the 
public and regent.  In the month prior, General Plastiras was forced to resign after he released a letter that favored 
German intervention in 1941. Even after the letter caused an uproar in the country, Plastiras refused to step down. 
With advice from ministers of every party, Damaskinos appointed an individual he believed could garner the support 
of the divided people, as well as guarantee a successful plebiscite within three months, Admiral Petros Voulgaris.  The 
British relationship with the admiral was strengthened by the fact that he was credited with the halt of the mutinous 
Greeks in Egypt from April of the previous year. 
It did not take long for many within the British government to realize that Voulgaris represented the best option for 
a stable Greek government thus far. In a telegram to Churchill on May 5, 1945, Leeper stated that little friction 
existed between the Admiral and the British government during their consultations, a notable rarity. In the face of 
other issues that troubled Greece at the time, a stable government would allow future goals to be accomplished 
without the turbulence common in the previous months.  Voulgaris, according to Leeper, had every chance of 
success, as he possessed great admiration for the British.[83] 
However, this telegram also held the beginnings of a discussion about an important factor of the Greek issue, the 
British legacy. As economic hardships hampered the Balkan nation, Leeper wrote to his Prime Minister that, "good 
government publicity is the best way for the Greek Government to capture public confidence."[84] More specifically, 
even a loan of a good public relations officer for a few months could capture the volatile public confidence, to 
convince both British and Greek citizens alike that various government economic and control policies ultimately 
benefit the people. With this in mind, Leeper reminded that, "His majesty's Government can hope justifiably, to get 
credit for producing order out of chaos; enabling free election to be held, and lifting a very shattered Balkan country 
onto a higher level than it has known."[85] 
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One of the clear signs that the British legacy was a successful one depended on the ability of the Greeks to assume 
the task of nation building. On June 2, 1945, Churchill sent a telegram to Admiral Voulgaris that discussed the arrival 
of Kyriakos Varvaresos, chief officer of the Bank of Greece, to Athens in assistance to the Greek government in the 
face of economic and financial problems. Within the telegram, Churchill praised the nation as a whole, as he 
continued to be "encouraged by the improvement which has taken place in the political situation," for which Admiral 
Vulgaris should have received credit.[86] Though he showed pride in the progress made by all within the country, 
Churchill urged the people to put aside the passions that lead to civil strife in order to assure the improvements 
would be maintained, and that democratic principles would be firmly re-established.[87] 
Nevertheless, all the social cohesion could not solve the rapid deterioration of the financial situation in Greece. For 
British Ministers such as Harold Macmillan, the time had come to transfer a major portion of the responsibility from 
General Scobie and to the British embassy in Athens. Yet, with the exception of a limited scope of accessible imports, 
the problem could only be solved by efforts within the nation itself.  According to Macmillan, "an external loan would 
be of no assistance, since the Greeks have enough foreign exchange...and a long, or even a money gift, would not 
affect the currency circulation within Greece itself."[88] The root of the problem was that the amount of money, 
which circulated throughout the country, was increasing much more rapidly than the supply of goods that could be 
bought. The austerity measures needed to correct this economic course could have been undertaken by the British, 
and would have if not given the political and economic state of their own nation at the time. In addition, the Cabinet 
agreed that British interference with the Greek government would only create additional unrest within the country. 
Great Britain did not possess the necessary available military or economic resources to take control of the Balkan 
nation, a condition directly connected to their descent from primary power status.[89] 
This telegram from Minister Macmillan held additional instances of British hesitation to further involve themselves 
in Greece. For example, Macmillan insisted that, "the bulk of the supplies which will be provided during the next six 
or twelve months must come from U.N.R.R.A."[90]  For programs that could not be covered by this kind of aid, such 
as railway reconstruction, the assistance of Great Britain, and more significantly the United States, would allow for 
the Balkan nation to import the materials necessary and slowly reduce the risk of inflation. In addition, despite the 
need for a sustainable and stable Greek armed force, the mostly American aid would only allow for a hundred 
thousand man civil defense force, which would mean that "for some time Greece must be inferior in military 
power...and she would not be in a position to defend the country from external attacks."[91] In both the economic 
and military arenas, Churchill's inability to dedicate tangible resources, as well as the consistent move to rely on 
American relief, clearly displayed the actions of a power well on its way to decline.[92] 
Further examination of the nature of American aid occurred in a telegram from Sir Desmond Morton, the Personal 
Assistant to the Prime Minister, to Churchill, as well as a Cabinet minute from June 20, 1945. While Morton urged 
the Prime Minister to remember that the Britain must commit to aid both Italy and Greece to achieve a reasonable 
standard of life, he also clarified a key source of this aid. According to this source, the integral aid would come from 
their American allies, as long as the internal politics of the country would allow them. The Cabinet minute reinforced 
this idea when it advocated for, "an Anglo-American Production mission to be sent to Greece to advise the Greeks 
how they could best help themselves."[93] Another advantage of this mission would be the invaluable expertise the 
two nations could provide to increase industrial production, as well as increased imports, and the U.N.R.R.A would 
respond to requests for supplies and shipping.[94] 
However,the one aspect of British intervention that both countries agreed on was the continuation of British 
assistance with the military, despite earlier communications that hoped for a withdrawal of the army's resources. 
Prime Minister Voulgaris stated that Great Britain's leadership could make for a more time-efficient mission 
completion. In addition, fear still persisted within the country's leadership that only through the utilization of a third 
party, such as Great Britain, could it be assured that no political advantages or activities would taint the rebuilding 
process. This decision was tempered with the official statement that Greeks should be the head of the military 
mission.  Ultimately, Leeper and General Scobie reached an agreement at the end of June to include the Greek 
government in the assumption of powers over the Greek Army, including appointments, promotions, dismissals and 
discipline. The combination of Greek and British interests together would be known as the Supreme War Council. If 
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at any point the Greek authorities believed the British council was not acting in their best general interest, the 
dispute would be taken to the diplomatic level between the two nation's embassies.[95] 
In the six months since the outbreak of violence in Athens, the nature of British involvement in Greece underwent a 
distinct change, as did their stature in the international community. While the establishment of a democratic Greece 
remained the goal throughout this period, the method by which Britain attempted to accomplish this varied 
throughout, and became a symptom of their place amongst world powers. Even though negotiations between Stalin, 
Churchill and Roosevelt were common, Churchill's talks were not for the sake of political positioning, but political 
survival. Especially given the economic resources of Britain at this time, the inclusion of the Allies into Greece was 
necessary for their vision of the Balkan nation to persist after an inevitable European withdrawal. As important as 
the economics were to the future of Greece, the debate developed into something more complex. While well-aware 
of the growing power of the United States and Soviet Union, Great Britain continued to fight for hegemony in an old 
sphere of historic influence. Whether as a result of quick successes, like the defeat of the Egyptian Mutiny, or 
prolonged debates, such as over the plebiscite, each trial for Churchill exposed a different fundamental weakness in 
the British political state. 
Ultimately, the admittance of these shortcomings cemented Great Britain's role as a secondary consideration, as it 
would not be long until the financial weight of the United States, and the political influence of the Soviet Union took 
assumed control over this conflict between communism and democracy for themselves, leaving Great Britain as an 
ancillary spectator in future Cold War forums. 
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